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Revealed Informal Activity 
 
What does it mean to be in the informal sector? Many characterizations have been used in 
the literature, for example, firms that are unregistered or employ a small workforce or 
firms/economic enterprises that do not have access to formal capital markets. But many 
people participate in both formal and informal activities, while classification of participation is 
often based on primary employment. This creates limitations to the analytical power of 
existing measures of informality. We develop a method for assigning households to the 
informal sector by inferring informal sector activity using income and expenditure surveys. 
We apply this method to the case of Bulgaria using LSMS income and expenditure surveys 
before and after a significant economic reform and compare it to those made using other 
indicators of informal sector activity. Our work shows that the informal sector acts as a buffer 
for households during periods of crisis when formal sector employment opportunities are 
limited. It shows the limitations of alternative stylized measures of informality in assessing the 
vulnerability of households involved in the informal sector, especially during periods of 
extreme economic hardship. 
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Revealed informal activity 
 
In order to perform economic analysis on the effectiveness of policies aimed at those 
individuals who derive income from informal sector activity we first need to have 
accurate measurements of informal sector activity. If we are to perform economic 
analysis at a disaggregated level we also need to be able to allocate households (or 
individuals) into the informal sector.
1 Here the biggest hurdle to formal economic 
analysis is that the informal sector is hard to define and hard to measure.  The 
difficulty  in  measuring  the  informal  sector  makes  it  difficult   to  say  anything 
economically concrete about the nature of the informal sector and its participants.  We 
define a new procedure which, using existing data sets, will allow us to statistically 
measure the informal sector. With this new method in hand we wil l then be able to 
make formal inferences about the informal sector and its participants ,  analyze the 
economic forces that drive the movement into and out of the informal sector and 
discuss  economic policies aimed at helping those individuals participating   in the 
informal sector. 
  A major open question in the informal sector literature is the definition of 
what it means to be in the informal sector. While there seems to be a consensus on the 
broad concept of informality, namely “economic units with scarce or no capital, using 
primitive technologies and unskilled labor [..] low productivity”….”not complying 
with norms in terms of labor contracts, taxes and labor regulations” (ILO, 1991; ILO, 
2002), the measurement of these characteristics have posed enormous hurdles to both 
researchers  and  policy  makers.  Clearly,  the  productivity  of  informal  activities  is 
difficult to measure and compare, while differences in legal frameworks both related 
to registration of small enterprises and labor regulations makes it difficult to construct 
comparable informality indicators on the basis of legal compliance.  
  The literature has therefore adopted shortcuts in defining informality on the 
basis for instance of the type of unit of employment, especially its size, or the type of 
job,  such  as  work  without  labor  protection.  However,  the  mainstream  self-
employment literature (e.g. Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982; and Evans and Leighton, 
1989)  indicates  that  entry  into  self-employment  should  typically  be  seen  as  a 
vocational choice in line with a worker’s comparative advantage, although one with 
                                                 








irregular relations with the state. If this is indeed the case, informality defined solely 
on the basis of firm size may create a misplaced perception of the vulnerability or low 
productivity  status  of  informal  ac tivities.  Indeed,  research  on  sm all  and  medium 
enterprises  in  developing  countries  often  reveals  them  as  drivers  of  creative 
destruction  and  growth,  as  opposed  to  participants  in  unproductive  activities  at  the 
outskirts of the economy (Ty bout, 2000). Registration as a further refinement of the 
measure is not very helpful in this respect either, given the different requirements for 
business registration across countries. Nor is the definition of unskilled labor involved 
in  informal  activiti es,  given  that  many  highly  entrepreneurial  jobs  do  not  require 
higher  levels  of  education,  while  people  with  even  tertiary  education  often  get 
involved in secondary employment in the informal sector. 
Another  issue  in  dealing  with  the  informal  sector  is  tha t  many  people  may 
participate  in  both  formal  and  informal  activities  (e.g.  doctors  and  taxi  drivers  may 
participate  in  both  formal  and  informal  activities).  Many  apparently  unemployed 
people or people out of the labor force may be involved in informal acti vities, while 
numerous examples can be given of informal workers working for formal enterprises. 
All these problems suggest that a new method of inferring informal activity is needed.  
We  adopt  a  broad  and  flexible  definition  of  informality  that  go es  beyond 
managing a small firm or working without formal labor contract. It encompasses any 
effort  undertaken  to  enhance  one’s  living  standard  beyond  reported  income.  We 
believe that this measure captures the broad spirit of the concept of informality, while 
avoiding many of the shortcomings of stylized shortcuts in its definition.  
Our novel approach uses household information about income and expenditure 
to  allocate  households  (or  individuals)  to  the  informal  sector.  We  argue  that 
households  that  spend  considerably  more  than  their  total  income  must  be  getting 
income  from  informal  sources.  In  this  context,  total  income  is  the  sum  of  labor 
income, transfers, and the change in asset position. If after accounting for all of these 
sources of income there is still a large difference in announced income and announced 
expenditure then we argue that the household is participating in the informal sector.  
In  consuming  goods  and  services  in  amounts  far  in  excess  of  what  its  measured 
income  would  suggest,  the  household  (or  individual)  has  “revealed”  itself  to  be 
participating in the informal sector. 
Key to our method is the use of income and expenditures accounts to assign 







the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)
2 data sets provide a good basis for 
such an exercise as they incorporate all relevant information on the flow of resources 
in and out of the household. Specifically, the expenditure accounts incorporate data on 
all expenditures including durable goods, while the income accounts contain data on 
both  labor  and  non -labor  incomes,  including  the  net  incomes  from  agricultural 
production  and  consumption,  remittances  and  sav ings.  With  the  income  and 
expenditure accounts devised in such a  way, total expenditures should equal total 
incomes.   
Our  main  idea  is  to  assign  any  household  with  significant  excess  of 
expenditures over incomes to participation in informal sector activities. Clearly, this 
definition of informal activity is quite broad but one of the purposes of this paper is to 
compare our approach of measuring the informal sector with other approaches. Once 
this is carefully done we will be able to give guidance to practitioners as to what 
threshold values to use so that the informal  sector activity that we identify accords 
with accepted definitions of the informal sector. The elegance in this approach is that 
we have a deterministic method to infer informal sector activity from established 
cross-sectional, longitudinal and panel data sets that will allow economic researches 
to bring all their established tools to bear on important questions regarding the 
informal sector.  
Up to now our discussion has focused on whether the household was involved 
in informal sector activity, without ad dressing which person in the household may 
have been directly involved in the informal sector.  The household is generally the 
appropriate unit of analysis, as expenditure is difficult to assign to any one individual. 
While the source of formal sector incom e can often be assigned to an individual, in 
keeping with our idea of the informal sector, informal income cannot. For example, 
the formal sector employee may have a second informal sector job; an apparently 
non-working member of the household may in fact  be employed in the informal 
sector; or children may be participating in the informal sector.  While we are able to 
easily assign households to the informal sector , the data requirements for assigning 
informal  sector  income  to  particular  persons  in  that  hous ehold  are  much  more 
stringent. It may be possible to employ time use data, when available, to allocate 
informal sector activity to individuals. 
                                                 







The Informal Sector during Crisis: The Case of Bulgaria 
We use data from Bulgaria to apply our measure of revealed informal activity. 
During the period of study Bulgaria underwent significant economic change which 
will allow us  to  see how our measure of informal activity  compares  to the other 
methods of measuring informal sector activity. We will also be able to study how 
informal sector activity adjusts to changing economic conditions, especially in times 
of severe economic stress.  
During the first half of the 1990s Bulgaria experienced significant output loss 
and rising inflation, much more than in most other Central and East European (CEE) 
countries. Whereas the CEE economies that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 
reached the trough of their output loss in 1991-92 and were able to contain inflation 
by 1993, Bulgaria’s GDP continued to fall through 1993, while hyperinflation was 
witnessed as late as 1997. This lackluster performance relative to most other CEE 
countries was largely a result of the absence of reform until the financial crisis of 
1996-97.  
Reforms  were  initiated  in  earnest  only  after  the  financial  crisis,  and  they 
included rapid privatization, reform of the pension and social-welfare structure, and 
the  establishment  of  a  currency  board.  One  of  the  immediate  outcomes  of  this 
programme was the transfer of most of Bulgaria’s productive resources from public 
into private hands, such that by the end of the 1990s, the private sector accounted for 
nearly 70 per cent of the country’s GDP (National Statistical Institute 2003; Bulgarian 
Privatization Agency 2000). In the process, official employment declined at the rate 
of about 2 per cent per annum and as late as 2001 the unemployment rate was as high 
as 17.3 per cent, with 62 per cent of the unemployed people remaining unemployed 
for more than a year. At the same time the unemployment benefit system in Bulgaria 
remained among of the least generous in Europe (Garibaldi, Makovec and Stoyanova 
2001). 
The crisis of 1996-97 contributed to not only rapid restructuring and labour 
shedding, but also to a significant real wage decline, such that by 1997 the average 
real wage in Bulgaria was 61.1 per cent lower than its 1990 level (Rutkowski 2003). 
Besides earnings, hyperinflation also eroded savings; indeed much more than in other 
transition economies in CEE (Rutkowski 1999; IMF 2002). All of these contributed to 







It  is interesting to  note that  despite the low level of unemployment benefits, 
one  of  the  highest  unemployment  rates  in  CEE,  and  high  correlation  between 
unemployment and poverty, reservation wages in Bulgaria remained high throughout 
the  transition  period  (Rutkowski  1999).  This  observation,  together  with  the 
extraordinarily  high  discouragement  rate  among  unemployed  males  indicates  that  a 
high  proportion  of  the  Bulgarian  population  might  have  found  its  way  towards  the 
informal  economy  (Garibaldi  et  al.  2001).  The  plausibility  of  this  proposition  is 
further  augmented  by  the  extraordinary  payroll  tax  burden  in  transition  Bulgaria, 
accumulating into a 41 per cent tax wedge between labour costs to employer and take 
home earnings, as well as by an excessively restrictive business environment leading 
to a lower number of officially registered Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) than 
elsewhere  in  CEE.  According  to  existing  macroeconomic  estimates,   the  informal 
economy in Bulgaria accounts for at least a fourth of the country’s GDP (Nenovski 
and Hristov 2000). 
 
Data and details on the measurement of informal activity 
The data used for our empirical analysis on Bulgaria is part of the Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS), provided by the World Bank. The surveys 
provide detailed information on employment, income, consumption, education and 
demographic characteristics for all members of about 2500 households in 1995, 1997 
and 2001. The surveys are repeated cross-sections and a small panel can be created 
only for part of the households available in both 1995 and 1997. In this study we only 
use the cross-sectional elements of each of the surveys.  
As indicated earlier, we focus on the revealed informal activity of individuals 
and households by assigning to the informal sectors those households with reported 
incomes that systematically fall short of their reported expenditures.  The income and 
expenditures accounts available in the LSMS data sets provide a good basis for such 
an exercise as they incorporate all relevant information on the flow of resources in 
and  out  of  the  household.  The  expenditure  accounts  incorporate  data  on  all 
expenditures including durable goods, while the income accounts contain data on both 
labor and non-labor incomes, including the net incomes from agricultural production 
and  consumption,  remittances  and  savings.    Moreover,  the  Bulgarian  LSMS  data 







inventories.    With  the  income  and  expenditure  accounts  devised  such,  total 
expenditures  should  equal  total  incomes.  That  expenditures  can  greatly  exceed 
incomes in the data indicates participation in informal sector activities.  
In order to avoid the pos sibility of a systematic statistical error affecting our 
exercise, we use as a point of departure a reference household of which we are sure 
that  it  belongs  to  the  formal  sector.  We  select  households  consisting  of married 
couples
3, where both the head and  spouse are of working age
4, work on a term-less 
contract and a 40-hour week schedule, neither of them reports any second job or self-
employment activity and the household does not own a household business. We 
exclude from the sample households in which either spouse is pursuing higher studies 
at the time of the interview. For a sample of these households we calculate the median 
seasonally deflated expenditures and incomes for both 1995 and 2001 and then take 
the ratio of the two. Our results indicate that t he ratio of expenditures to incomes is 
1.096581 in 1995 and 1.089261 in 2001. In other words, on average, for our reference 
category of a formal sector household defined in a rather conservative way, total 
expenditures are approximately equal to total incomes.  
Figure 1 highlights the discrepancies between the logarithm of incomes and 
expenditures for the reference households and compares these discrepancies with 
those of the total samples for 1995 and 2001.  We observe that the overlap between 
incomes and expenditures is significantly more even for the reference categories than 
the total sample and assign this difference to the impact of the informal sector.  
While the ratio of the median expenditures and incomes for the reference 
household is approximately 1, we prefer to rely on a significantly stricter measure of 
the informal  sector and  assign  to  the  informal  sector any  household  for  which 
expenditures exceed income by 100 per cent
5. Our rationale is quite obvious; to fund 
this expenditure lifestyle, household must obtain income from somewhere. Borrowing 
was fairly primitive in Bulgaria at this time (and it is so in a large number of 
                                                 
3 The households of single heads of households in Bulgaria are few and aside from family of 
divorced individuals, they typically are elderly (widowed) households. 
 
4 In Bulgaria in the 1990s this means 18-55 for women and 18-60 for men. This is based on 
the fact that 18 is the age of graduation from compulsory secondary education, while statutory 
retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for men.  
5 In our empirical analysis we experimented with alternative definitions, ranging from 







developing  countries)  and  our  income  measure  already  includes  transfers,  incomes 
from real estate, financial assets and changes in asset positions.  
We also compare our measure of revealed informal activity with some stylized 
measures  of  informality.  Specifically,  we  define  three  additional,  fairly  stylized 
informality  measures.  First,  we  define  a  dummy  variable,  taking  the  valu e  of  1  if 
anyone  in  the  household  works  without  a  contract  and  or  formal  labour  protection. 
Secondly,  we  define  a  dummy  variable,  that  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the  household 
either operates  a small business  or anyone in  the households works  as  own -account 
self-employed individual.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of total expenditures and incomes 
 




























































































  Table 1 reports the proportion of households with some informal activity using 
our approach to measuring informal activity and using other common approaches to 
measure  informal  sector  activity.  Two  striking  differences  are  apparent  in  Table  1. 
The  first  difference   is  in  the  relative  sizes  of  the  proportion  of  households 
participating in the informal sector. Our preferred measure of informal sector activity 
estimates  that  roughly  one  third  of  all  Bulgarian  households  that  were  sampled  in 
1995  and  2001  participated  i n  the  informal  sector.  In  1997  the  proportion  of 
households  with  some  informal  sector  activity  more  than  doubled.  This  is  in  stark 
contrast  to  the  other  measures  of  informal  sector  activity.  The  other  measures 
estimated the proportion of households participating in the informal sector to be much 
smaller with the combined measure reporting that only 10 percent of the households 
sampled had any informal sector activity.  
  The  second  glaring  difference  between  our  measure  of  revealed  informal 
sector activity and the other measures is the behavior of the informal sector during the 
height  of  the  Bulgarian  economic  crisis.  Our  measure  of  informal  sector  activity 
doubles during 1997 which is immediately after the worst of the Bulgarian economic 
crisis. The Bulgarian crisis of 1996-1997 led to massive layoffs and much lower real 
wages.  Given  this  type  of  significant  crisis  it  is expected  that  households  react  by 
augmenting  their  formal  sector  income  with  informal  sector  activity.  Using  the 
expenditure  approach  we  do  see  that  informal  sector  activity  increases  significantly 
during the crisis but falls back to pre-crisis levels by 2001.  
  Using  the  other  measures  of  informal  activity  such  as  self -employment  and 
working in jobs that offer little employment protections we see the opposite behavior. 
 
Table 1: Proportions of Households participating in Informal Sector  
Measure of Informal Activity  1995  1997  2001 
I1: Revealed Informal Activity  0.354  0.745  0.385 
I2: Self-employment  0.069  0.055  0.061 
I3: No worker protections  0.064  0.043  0.071 








These  measures  all  show  a  decline  in  the  informal  sector  during  the  period  of  the 
crisis. This highlights one of the weaknesses of these other measures in that they are 
employment  based  measures.  In  order  to  be  assigned  to  the  informal  sector  using 
these  measures  the  household  must  first  report  that  at  least  one  member  of  the 
household  is  either  self -employed  or  working  in  a  job  without  employment 
protections. A household is not reported to be in the informal sector if they don’t 
report working in one or they are laid off from their employment. During the crisis in 
1996 and 1997 there was massive job destruction which could be one reason why the 
size for the informal sector fell for the 1997 sample.  
   
Who is in the informal sector? 
  In order to investigate informal activity in more detail we now report marginal 
effects from simple Probit regression models with informal activity as the dependent 
variable.  We  use  three  different  measures  of  informality,  namely  the  measure  of 
revealed informal activity, which indicates that household expenditures are at least 
twice as high as household incomes, a dummy variable indicating that the household 
 
Table 2: Variables used in Probit Regressions 
Variable Name  Definition 
 
Age_Hd  Age of head of household 
AgeSq_Hd  Squared age of head of household 
Married_Hd  =1 if head married 
Female_Hd  =1 if head female 
Ethnic_Hd  =1 if head member of ethnic minority 
EdSec_Hd  =1 if head;s highest education is secondary education 
EdVoc_Hd  =1 if head’s highest education is vocational education 
EdTer_Hd  =1 if head’s highest education is University education 
EdSec_Oth  Proportion of household with only secondary education 
EdVoc_Oth  Proportion of household with vocational education 
EdTer_Oth  Proportion of household with University education 
Prop6  Proportion of household under the age of 6 
Prop715  Proportion of household between the ages of 7 and 15 
Propgt60  Proportion of household over the age of 60 
HHsize  Size of Household 









is involved in small business activities and a dummy variable indicating that there is 
at least one household  member who works without a labor contract  and receives no 
labor  protection. As  explanatory  variables,  we  use  various  household  characteristics 
such as age of head and age squared to see if informal sector activity is non -linear in 
age  of  t he  head  of  household.  We  also  include  a  gender  variable  to  distinguish 
households whose heads are female from other households.  
We include information on the educational attainment of the head and on the 
average educational attainment of the other members of the household. To do this we 
include dummy variables for an individual’s highest qualification. The labor market 
literature on Bulgaria during the 1990s indicates that the type of education acquired 
has significant impact on the probability of individuals to obtain a job in the formal 
labor market (Dimova and Gang, 2007). Hence, we find it important to differentiate 
between types  of education  acquired:  university, versus vocational,  versus general 
secondary education, as opposed to the level of education acquired, captured by a 
number of years of education variable. Based on previous research, our assumption is 
that  higher  levels  of  education  imply  higher  probability  to  enter  the  formal  labor 
market and lower probability to enter the informal labor market. We also assume that 
the level of education of the household is more important in making these choices 
than the level of education of secondary household members (Grimm and Gunter, 
2005).  We  also  include  variables  that  indicate  whether  the  household  contains 
children or pensioners and we include information on the location of the household 
and its overall size.  
  The  results  for  our  measure  of  revealed  informal  activity  can  be  found  in 
Table 3. The first result of consequence is that it appears that for 1997 there are few 
significant explanatory variables. This year is an important year for Bulgaria in that 
Bulgaria  was  undergoing a severe economic  crisis  and was  starting  a  program  of 
significant economic reforms. From Table 2 it is also clear that this year almost three 
quarters of the households in our sample had some form of informal sector activity. 
Given the extent of the crisis and the observation that almost all households were 
participating in the informal sector, it is not surprising that there are no clear patterns 
appearing from the Probit regressions.  
For the other two years, 1995 and 2001, the results are much clearer. In these 
years  only  about  a  third  of  all  households  had  some  form  of  informal  sector 








regressions  indicate  that  there  is  significantly  more  informal  sector  activity  in  rural 
areas  than  in  urban  areas.   To  see  whether  there  are  significant  differences  in  the 
nature  of  informal  activities  across   rural  and  urban  areas,  we  estimate  separate 
regressions also for the sample of urban households. 
 In 1995 households whose heads are married are less likely to have informal 
sector activity. This is not the case in 2001. One reason for this might be than in 1995 
the public sector was large and that there was a bias towards older (and hence more 
likely to be married) employees during this time. In 2001 the economic reforms had 
taken effect with a much smaller public sector and a much larger private sector w hich 
did not have the bias towards married employees ( Dimova, Gang, and Landon-Lane, 
2006). 
  Another interesting result is that, while not completely consistent across 1995 
and 2001, education has a negative marginal effect on the probability of particip ating 
in  the  informal  sector.  In  2001  the  result  is  much  stronger  with  both  education 
 
Table 3: Marginal effects: revealed informal activity 
  1995  1997  2001 
Variable  Full  Urban  Full  Urban  Full  Urban 
Age_Hd  -0.006  -
0.015*** 









-0.030  -0.055  -0.030  -0.035 
Female_Hd  0.060*  0.061  0.010  0.020  0.053*  0.045 
Ethnic_Hd  0.046  -0.005  -0.010  -0.065  0.185***  0.139*** 
EdSec_Hd  -0.003*  0.007  0.018  0.015  -0.029  -0.064* 
EdVoc_Hd  -0.010  -0.001  -0.021  -0.004  -0.036  -0.057* 
EdTer_Hd  -0.004*  0.004  0.033  0.044  -0.038  -0.071* 
EdSec_Oth  -0.168**  -0.010  -0.066  -0.087  -0.088  -0.157** 
EdVoc_Oth  -0.158**  -0.092  -0.074  -0.118  -0.120*  -0.166** 
EdTer_Oth  -
0.267*** 
-0.202**  -0.052  -0.073  -0.193**  -0.201** 
Prop6  -0.041  -0.231*  0.194*  0.293*  -0.179  -0.277** 
Prop715  0.008  0.011  0.129  0.045  0.186**  0.058 
Propgt60  -0.027  -0.065  0.063  0.081  -
0.153*** 
-0.111** 








Sample  2462  1644  2323  1556  2633  1756 
Pseudo-R









variables for the head and for the other members of the household being significant 
and  negative  for  the  urban  sample.  In  the  1995  regressions,  the  negative  impact  of 
education is stronger in the full sample and weaker in the urban sample.  This change 
from  1995  could  be  due  to  the  economic  reforms  encouraging a  private  economy 
where  education in  the  formal  urban  sector  is  more  rewarded  than  in  the  previous 
socialist regime. 
  The age variables are also significant, especially in the urban sample, with the 
probability of informal  sector activity declining  at  a decreasing rate with the age of 
the head of the household. Thus as the head of the household gets older it appears that 
they  are  more  likely  to  find  formal  full  time  employment. During  the  period  of  the 
crisis in 1997 there is no age effect but this is rather understandable as all households 
were affected by the crisis.  
  The makeup of the household also has some affect on informal sector activity. 
While  gender  does  not  play  a  strong  role  in  the  results  we  observe  that  households 
with children under the age of 6 are less likely to have informal sector activity during 
the years 1995 and 2001 which might reflect the fact that members of the family that 
otherwise participate in  the informal sector refrain  from  this  when they  have young 
children. During the crisis however families with young children were more likely to 
participate in informal sector activity, possibly as a ma tter of last resort at a time of 
extreme strain.  
  In  2001  households  whose  head  were  members  of  an  ethnic  minority  were 
more likely to  have informal  sector  activity.  This  result is  not  present  in any of the 
other periods. One reason for this is that in 19 95 the economy was still transitioning 
from  a  socialist  economy  where  there  were  less  discrimination  in  employment 
practices than in the private sector oriented economy of 2001. 
  The  results  from  the  Probit  analysis  for  our  measure  of  revealed  informal 
activity,  while  not  exhaustive,  do  appear  to  be  reasonable  in  that  the  explanatory 
variables have in general the appropriate sign. It would now be interesting to compare 
these results with those based on the other two (stylized) definitions of informality.  
Table 4  reports the marginal  effects  from  our Probit  regression results  using 
the  measure  of  informal  activity  that  uses  the  availability  of  labour  contract  and 
protection as a measure of informality. These results are broadly consistent with those 
on  revealed  informal  activity  in  that  in  the  relatively  normal  years  1995  and  2001 








households participation in informal activities. Interestingly, the vocational education 
of  both  the  house hold  head  and  other  household  members  has  a  positive  impact  on 
participation in informal activities, possibly on account of the obsolescence of these 
types  of  skills  in  the  changing  labor  market.  Finally,  as  in  the  case  of  revealed 
informal activities, belonging to an ethnic minority  group, once again has a positive 
impact on the probability to participate in the informal sector.  
While  there  are  similarities  between  the  results  on  informality  measured  as 
revealed  informal  activity  and  informality  based  on   the  labor  contract  measure  of 
informal  activities,  t he  results  on  informality  as  se lf-employment/small  business  
activity  stand  in  stark  contrast  with  those  based  on  the  other  two  measures.  Most 
importantly,  the  Probit  results  reported  in  Table  5  indicate  that  during  all  years, 
including  the  crisis  year  1997,  higher  levels  of  education  are  positively  correlated 
with the probability to run a small enterprise or be  (own account) self-employed. In 
this way, the results on the probability to be self-employed or small business manager 
reveal  the  small  enterprise  sector  in  Bulgaria  as  one  more  akin  to  dynamic 
entrepreneurship  than  one  of  shadow  activities  and  once  again  confirm  the  need  of 
using alternative measures when trying to assess the characteristics and fa te of those 
involved in the informal economy.  
 
Table 4: Marginal effects: no labour security 
  1995  1997  2001 
Variable  Full  Urban  Full  Urban  Full  Urban 
Age_Hd  0.002  0.001  -0.000  -0.001  0.001  -0.000 
AgeSq_Hd  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
Married_Hd  0.005  0.019  0.011  0.018  -0.028**  -0.018 
Female_Hd  0.006  0.019  0.019  0.025  0.001  0.015 
Ethnic_Hd  0.013  0.033  0.027*  0.006  0.052***  0.049** 
EdSec_Hd  0.016  0.019  -0.012  -0.008  -0.000  0.019 
EdVoc_Hd  -0.011  -0.009  -0.002  -0.002  0.019*  0.032** 
EdTer_Hd  -0.019  -0.022  -0.002  -0.004  -0.001  0.012 
EdSec_Oth  0.019  0.028  0.012  -0.017  0.050*  0.046 
EdVoc_Oth  0.035  0.056*  0.035*  -0.023  0.055**  0.039 
EdTer_Oth  -0.114**  -0.090*  -0.014  -0.033  -0.075*  -0.072* 
Prop6  0.052  0.078  -0.007  -0.016  -0.027  -0.068 
Prop715  -0.066**  -0.080*  -0.034  -0.095**  -0.046  -0.056 
Propgt60  -0.030  -0.018  -0.048**  -0.035  -0.052**  -0.058** 
HHsize  0.009**  0.010**  0.005*  0.009**  0.013***  0.018*** 
Urban  -0.001    0.001    -0.009   
Sample  2462  1644  2323  1556  2633  1756 
Pseudo-R










Discussion and Conclusions 
We  outline  a  method  to  infer  informal  sector  activity  using  income  and 
expenditure surveys. We apply this method to the case of Bulgaria before and after a 
significant economic reform and investigate the effects of economic crisis on informal 
sector  activity.  We  find  that  the  informal  sector  acts,  in  part,  as  a  buffer  for 
households during periods of crisis when formal sector employment opportunities are 
limited. In this sense the presence of an informal sector provides a “safety net” and is 
welfare improving.  
  Our method is flexible enough to include all types of informal activities and 
unlike alternative fairly stylized measures of informality, it does not require us to 
define  ex-ante  what  informality  means.  We  argue  that  our  measure  is  therefore 
superior to measures based on types of units of employment and types of jobs, as 
these measures are difficult to compare across countries and omit situations such as 
simultaneous  participation  in  formal  and  informal  activities,  as  well  as  situations 




Table 5.: Marginal effects: self-employed/small business 
  1995  1997  2001 
Variable  Full  Urban  Full  Urban  Full  Urban 
Age_Hd  0.001  0.005*  0.004  0.006*  0.000  0.002 
AgeSq_Hd  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000 
Married_Hd  -0.017  -0.014  -0.016  -0.002  0.004  0.015 
Female_Hd  -0.024  -0.015  -0.005  -0.001  -0.025**  -0.024 
Ethnic_Hd  -0.028*  -0.022  -0.013  -0.023  -0.009  0.004 
EdSec_Hd  0.029  0.046*  -0.008  -0.015  0.027*  0.044* 
EdVoc_Hd  0.011  0.014  0.003  -0.004  0.034***  0.047*** 
EdTer_Hd  0.064***  0.073***  0.004  -0.006  0.034***  0.049*** 
EdSec_Oth  0.005  0.006  0.076***  0.086**  0.035  0.035 
EdVoc_Oth  -0.002  -0.007  0.038*  0.048  0.027  0.028 
EdTer_Oth  0.013  0.003  0.105***  0.136***  0.102***  0.138*** 
Prop6  -0.080  -0.002  -0.001  0.055  0.044  0.058 
Prop715  -0.007  -0.004  0.029  0.085*  0.024  0.041 
Propgt60  -0.019  -0.012  -0.013  -0.019  -
0.052*** 
-0.054* 
HHsize  0.016***  0.010*  0.006**  0.001  0.007***  0.012*** 
Urban  -0.010    0.003    0.009   
Sample  2462  1644  2323  1556  2633  1756 
Pseudo-R









We  use   household  information  about  income  and  expenditure  to  allocate 
individuals to the informal sector. We argue that  households that spend considerably 
more than their total income must be receiving income from informal sources. In this 
context  total  income  is  defined  to  be  the  sum  of  labor  income,  transfers,  and  the 
change  in  asset  position.  If  after  accounting  for  all  of  these  sources  of  income ,  and 
assuring  that  our  variables  are  not  fraught  with  measurement  errors,  there  is  still  a 
large difference in announced income and announced expenditure then we argue that 
the household is participating in the informal sector.  
The main objective of this study is to develop a deterministic method to assign 
households  to  the  informal  sector.  Once  we  do  this  we  can  exploit  the  other 
information  that  is  available  for  these  households  in  formal  econometric  models. 
While  this  paper  sp ecifically  ask  about  who  was  in  the  informal  sector  and  its 
correlates  before,  during  and  after  economic  crisis,  with  informality  defined  and 
simply  captured, questions can  be  addressed about  the  role  that  the  informal  sector 
plays in the economy, as well as gain insight into what are the important determinants 
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